An End to All Wars?

A world of confronting blocs, or a world of new global security arrangements?

If we look at current global trends, the most common assumption is that today’s world is going through a deep and accelerated process of power shift. And when power shifts, we know from history that divergence starts to take place: on the one hand, there are satisfied but declining powers, let’s call them “lions,” that will do everything they can to defend the rules of the game, the “the status quo”; on the other, there are dissatisfied but increasingly self-confident powers, “wolves,” that will do everything they can in order to change such rules.

In a life span of 50 years, we can expect two different yet related situations. In the short to medium term, the confrontation between the world’s greatest powers will likely increase, specifically due to technological, demographic and environmental factors.

In the medium to long term, if this imbalance is going to be solved, the world may experience a “back-to-the-future” scenario or—as we say in international relations theory jargon—the creation of a new global order, in which the great powers can accommodate their interests in a more pragmatic way.

In any case, the three most important challenges that humanity would have to deal with are climate change, the identity crisis, both domestic and international, of the US, and the capability of China to increase its benevolent soft power.

Can technology be harnessed as a force for peace, rather than war?

In a seminal article from 1978 titled “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” Robert Jervis coined the idea of the “offense-defense balance.” The theory argues that, with all other things being equal, the chances to live in a more stable and peaceful international system depend on two variables: when defensive weaponry has the advantage over offensive weaponry and when it’s possible to differentiate the military posture of states, particularly a defensive strategy over an offensive one.

Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) are likely to be a source of further tensions in the years to come. Most EDTs applied to warfare seem to favor offensive capabilities, while the posture of great powers remains unclear in this regard. EDTs are likely to have unsettling global effects, something similar to those that, for instance, we witnessed with the appearance of automatic artillery, air power and nuclear power. Unless the world’s greatest powers reach an agreement to advance a new generation of arms control agreements, the incentives “to strike first” are unlikely to be reduced.

How can international cooperation adapt to new security challenges?

The drivers of international cooperation have always been, and will continue to be, of four major types:

1. Fear: The concern about others’ miscalculations may induce states to downscale and adopt more cautious, less selfish and less short-term attitudes.

2. Institutional design: A stable and effective collaboration among the world’s great powers has to spring from a set of rules and decision-making procedures in which all actors “win” something. Yet today’s world is characterized by a large number of intergovernmental forums whose effectiveness, unfortunately, is questionable. A new wave of multilateral entrepreneurship is needed.

3. Norms and principles: Cooperation needs a “culture of trust” among actors who need to understand that multilateralism is the only solution for global challenges. In the past, especially after major wars, great powers used to meet around a negotiating table with the aim of acting harmoniously, as if they were playing a concert. Interesting and inspiring, yet short-lived attempts.

4. All of the above: What looks like the most viable option is, indeed, a combination of the three features mentioned above—force, rules and norms—implemented all together.

Time will tell if, in the next 50 years, such a more ordered, less unstructured scenario will come to pass again and, above all, in a better way than in the past.